Abstract-We study a new network architecture based on standard FDDI networks. This network, called FDDI-based reconfigurable network (FBRN), is constructed using multiple FDDI token rings and has the ability to reconfigure itself in the event of extensive damage to the network. Thus, an FBRN has the potential to provide high available bandwidth even in the presence of numerous faults. Realization of this potential depends crucially on a reconfiguration algorithm that guides the reconfiguration process. We design and analyze a reconfiguration algorithm for FBRNs. Our algorithm is optimal in the sense that it always produces a configuration that results in the maximum available bandwidth for a given fault pattern. This algorithm has a polynomial time complexity. We also show that the available bandwidth of an FBRN is dramatically improved with our reconfiguration algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
ETWORKS employed in mission-critical systems must be N highly survivable. Survivability of a system relates to its ability to withstand extensive damage, especially battle damage 1161. For example, SAFENET, a military standard developed by the Navy's Next Generation Computer Resources (NGCR) program, specifies that the network must survive multiple enemy hits 151. Furthermore, the survivability of a system requires that the network not only remain connected in the event of extensive damage but also provide sufficient transmission bandwidth to keep the system functional. In this study, we address issues related to the design, analysis, and realization of such a network.
Our study is based on the FDDI (Fiber Distributed Data Interface) standard 121. High data rate, guaranteed bandwidth, and built-in fault tolerance make FDDI a suitable candidate for mission-critical applications [221. Several new civil and military networks have adopted FDDI as a backbone network. Examples include the High-speed Data Bus and the High-speed Ring Bus (HSDB/HSRB) 1241,[251, [281, the Survivable Adaptable Fiber Optic Embedded Network (SAFENET) [5] , 1121, [23] , [20] , and the Fiber Distributed Data Network (FDDN) 141 .
However, the survivability of the standard FDDI network is limited. In the worst case, two faults will partition the network. Our approach is to use multiple FDDI networks to construct a reconfigurable network. Such a network will be called an FDDI-Based Reconfiguvable Network, or FBRN for short. The key feature of an FBRN is its reconfiguration capability. This capability distinguishes an FBRN from an ordinary multiple-FDDI token ring network. Using its reconfigu-S. Kamat ration capability, an IFBRN can automatically alter its structure in the face of numerous faults. Consequently, an FBRN has the potential of providing high network bandwidth even when a large portion of the network is damaged.
Several issues need to be addressed in order to realize the full potential of an FBRN. Among these, the foremost is the design of an efficient reconfiguration algorithm. A reconfiguration algorithm is invoked to recover the network from a faulty situation. Faults degrade the system performance by lowering the available bandwidth. Hence, a reconfiguration algorithm !jhould be evaluated on the basis of the available bandwidth of the network in its new configuration obtained using the algorithm. In this sense, a reconfiguration algorithm is optimal if the configuration it generates achieves the maximum available bandwidth that can be obtained for the given fault pattern. In this paper, we study an optimal reconfiguration algorithm for FBRNs.
The design and analysis of such an optimal reconfiguration algorithm is particularly challenging. Our reconfiguration algorithm achieves optimality by carefully assessing the fault situation and fully exploiting the inherent fault tolerance of FDDI and the reconfiguration capability of FBRN.
Previous work in this area has mainly focused on the fault tolerance aspects of standard FDDI networks. Important characteristics and architectural design considerations of FDDI token ring networks are discussed in [14] , [18] , 1221, 1271. Various fault recovery and ring management procedures of FDDI are outlined in [8], [18] , 1191. An overview of FDDI MAC services is given in [27] . An automatic failure isolation and reconfiguration methodology for FDDI is described in [31] . A comparative analysis of various station attachment schemes based on the end-to-end user reliability and the mean time to failure is presented in [13] . Reliability analysis for dual homing FDDI networks is presented in [17] , [32] . An approximate method to evaluate dependability measures for FDDI networks is described in [30] .
Ralph, Ukrainsky, Schellack, and Weinberg [21] first demonstrated the feasibility of integrating two FDDI token rings the design of a reconfigur We formally establish the algorithm. Our algorithm has polynomial time complexity. We measure the worst case and average case performance of our algorithm in terms of the available bandwidth as a function of the number of f ble bandwidth achievable by any reconfigura
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FDDI-BASED RECONFIGURATION NETWORKS
FDDI networks are the building blocks of an FBRN network.
re presenting the FBRN architecture, we briefly of the relevant features of FDDI networks. The nodes are numbered from 1 to n. The successor of node i is node i + 1 unless i = n, in which case, the successor is node 1. We will use Suc(i) to denote the successor of node i. Similarly, the predecessor of node i will be denoted by Pre(i). The bunches are also numbered from 1 to n. The bunch between nodes i and Suc(i) will be denoted bunch i. Fig. 2 shows an FBRN with r = 4 and n = 4. For conciseness, the network is shown in a flat form rather than as a ring. That is, node 1 and bunch 4 are repeated on both ends of the figure to indicate the actual ring topology. As shown in the figure, each node has Y left ports and Y right ports. The ports on either side are numbered 1,2, . . ., r, starting from the top. These port numbers are also used to index the trunk links within a bunch. That is, individual trunk links within a bunch are also numbered 1,2, . . ., Y, beginning from the top. In a fault-free situation, each left port i is connected to its corresponding right port i in order to form Y FDDI trunk rings. We assume that each node is able to transmit and receive messages on any of these Y FDDI trunk rings. As usual, only one loop within each FDDI trunk ring is used for transmission at a time. Further, as intended by the FDDI standard, the loops within a trunk ring are wrapped up only in the event of faults. Note that a wrapped ring is twice as long as the unwrapped one and hence leads to an increase in ring latency. These assumptions are consistent with the FDDI standard and its current application. Note that the FBRN topology leads to an r-fold increase in the network bandwidth as compared to the basic FDDI architecture. We denote the traffic carrying capacity of an operational FDDI trunk ring as one unit of bandwidth. Thus, an FBRN has the maximum available bandwidth of Y units. ' We are interested in network performance when faults occur. As mentioned earlier, node faults are handled by activating the bypass switch. This would isolate the faulty node (and the hosts attached to it) from the network. A host executing critical applications may be multi-homed in order to remain connected to the network in spite of a node fault. In the rest of this paper, we focus on trunk link faults, i.e., faults which cause both loops to break at a point. Such faults impact network performance by reducing the network bandwidth. Consider the case shown in Fig. 3a . Seven faults are present in an FBRN with r = 4 and n = 4. One FDDI trunk ring has a single trunk link fault. The remaining three FDDI trunk rings have two faults each. With the standard FDDI trunk ring fault management, the trunk ring with a single fault can be recovered but the remaining rings are disabled leaving only one unit of available bandwidth.
FDDI and its Fault Manage
2 If more than one loop within a trunk ring were to be used simultaneously or wrap-up operations were allowed under nonfaulty conditions, the bandwidth would be higher Although such a network is more "survivable" than the original FDDI network, further improvements can be made. If the fault-free segments of disabled FDDI trunk rings can be combined, we should be able to form an additional operational trunk ring as shown in Fig. 3b . Thus, the available bandwidth of the system is increased. Clearly, this places a new requirement on the reconfiguration capabilities of the nodes: A node should be able to connect any of its left ports to any of its right ports. We assume that all nodes in an FBRN have this capability. This capability distinguishes an FBRN from ordinary multiple-FDDI ring networks. Nodes with such reconfiguration capability can be implemented using existing FDDI concentrator technology [l] 
FBRN Configuration State
The configuration state of an FBRN consists of two components: the connection plan, which specifies the port-to-port connections at individual nodes, and the fault status, which indicates the number and the locations of faulty links. These terms are formally defined below.
Connection Plan
The port-to-port connections at node m are defined by , the connection vectors of all the nodes. It is important to note that not all connection plans are valid. We now proceed to formalize the validity conditions for a Connection plan.
bviously, each node must ensure that no left port is connected to more than one right port and vice versa. Formally, this port mapping constraint, called one-to-one constraint, IS 
The system is assumed to be initially fault-free. That is, initially, for m = 1, 2, ..., n and i = 1, 2, ..., r, Right,
When faults occur, the fault detection processes monitoring the individual FDDI trunk rings update the fault status vectors (Left and Right) at the affected nodes.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we formally define the reconfiguration problem for FBRNs.
Optimal Connection Plan
Our objective is to design an efficient reconfiguration algorithm for FBRNs. The reconfiguration algorithm is invoked by the fault management mechanism of an FBRN to recover from faults. The input to the reconfiguration algorithm is the current system configuration. The output produced by the algorithm is a new connection plan that seeks to reduce the impact of faults on available bandwidth. We require that the connection plan generated by a reconfiguration be a valid one, i.e., it must satisfy (1) and (3). Further, it is desirable that the reconfiguration algorithm always generates an optimal connection plan, i.e., one which results in the maximum possible available bandwidth for the given fault status. We illustrate the notion of optimality of a connection plan with an example. Let us reconsider the FBRN with Y = 4 and n = 4 shown in Fig. 3 . This FBRN has seven faults with the pattern as indicated in the figure. The connection plan shown in Fig. 3a is the default one, i.e., C,[i] = i at every node m. With the default connection plan, the reconfiguration capability of the nodes is not used. Each FDDI trunk ring would try to recover using the default FDDI wrap-up mechanism. Only the first trunk ring (i.e., the top one in the figure), which has a single fault, will remain operational after performing the wrap-up operation described in Section 2a. The remaining FDDI trunk rings will cease to be operational, leaving an available bandwidth of one unit. Fig. 3b showed another configuration of this FBRN for the same fault patterin. This configuration was achieved by a connection plan that combined fault-free segments of trunk rings with multiple faults to produce an additional operational trunk ring. This configuration led to an available bandwidth of two units.
In Fig. 6 , we show yet another configuration of the FBRN for the same fault pattern. With a connection plan that is different from those :shown in Fig. 3a and Fig. 3b , the configuration in Fig. 6 achieves an available bandwidth of three units. This is the best one can achieve for seven faults in an FBRN with four rings. The connection plan shown in Fig. 6 is, therefore, an optimal one for the given fault status. The above example suggests that we can formulate the problem of selecting an optimal connection plan as a search problem where the search space consists of all valid connection plans. An exhaustive search in this space is, however, impractical. This is because the number of various valid connection plans is (r!),. To circumvent this problem, we need to introduce an abstractton of FBRN configurations. This abstraction should allow us to focus on the essential features of an FBRN configuration that determine its available bandwidth. By ignoring the inessential details, the search for an optimal configuration can be made more efficient. (1 7 ) Now the class of optimal FBRNs for the fault status G, denoted by CXG), is defined as
A logical FBRN V is optimal for fault status G if V E Q(G). Thus, for a given fault status G, the problem of finding an optimal connection plan is translated to that of finding a logical FBRN '?E Q(G).
AN OPTIMAL RECONFIGURATION ALGORITHM
We now present our reconfiguration algorithm. This algorithm is invoked by a distributed fault management mechanism present in an FBRN. Such a mechanism can be built on the top of a similar mechanism for individual FDDI trunk rings that is already provided by the FDDI Station Management (SMT) standard 131. This fault management mechanism continuously monitors the status of the FDDI trunk rings. It invokes the reconfiguration algorithm to recover from faulty situations. The reconfiguration algorithm executes at each node of the network. All nodes independently alter their own port connections to realize the new configuration. Figure  Fig Phase 1 initializes the data structures. The algorithm uses two data structures denoted by G' and ' -V G' is a vector of size n and is initialized to G. For an FBRN whose fault status is as shown in Fig. 3a, G would be initialized as (2,2,1,2) . G' keeps the count of unused faulty links from each bunch while a logical FBRN is being constructed. The set '?is used to store the desired logical FBRN. It is initialized to empty set.
Algorithm Description
Phase 2 uses the information provided by G to construct an optimal logcal FBRN. Phase 2 has an iterative structure; each iteration constructs one logical ring using a faulty or nonfaulty link from each of the n bunches. To realize the maximum achievable bandwidth, the algorithm tries to construct each logical ring with the minimum number of nonfaulty links.
Since an operational FDDI ring may contain one faulty link, our strategy is to construct logical rings with single fault whenever possible. This strategy effectively redistributes the faulty links so that they can be recovered later using FDDI's 12.
for k = 1 to n, k # j* do 13 . wrap-up capability. Thus, the algorithm first idenhfies a bunch having the largest number of unused faulty links (line 6). It then picks up a faulty link from this bunch and attempts to pick nonfaulty links from other bunches. If each of the remaining bunches has a nonfaulty available link, then Phase 2 succeeds in constructing a logical ring with a single fault.
If at the ith iteration G [ k ]
= Y -i + 1 for some bunch k, then the algorithm is forced to select a faulty link from bunch k as well (lines [15] [16] [17] [18] . This is because Y -i + 1 logical rings remain to be constructed at the beginning of the ith iteration and G'[k] = Y -i + 1 implies that all of the r -i + 1 unused links in bunch k are faulty.
As an illustration, consider again the FBRN shown in Fig. 3a . We show in Table 1 the values of G at the beginning of each iteration of Phase 2 when the reconfiguration algorithm is applied to this FBRN. The composition of the logical ring constructed in every iteration of Phase 2 is also shown. At the end 1, 1, 1, 1) ). We encourage the reader to verify this example to facihtate understanding of the algorithm. In Phase 3, the objective is to generate a port-to-port connection plan in accordance with the logical FBRN '?
constructed in Phase 2. The algorithm (executing at node m) appropriately updates its C, vector to achieve this objective. This phase uses an auxiliary data structure denoted by R-port-status,. This data structure keeps track of the isting port-to-port are marked as unassigned (lines 24-27). 
Algorithm Properties
We are interested in formally establishing that the reconfiguration algorithm presented above always generates a optimal reconfiguration algorithm. The derivations of these results are omitted here due to space limitations. The reader is referred to [ll] for the detailed derivations.
Performance Observations
The numerical results for an FBRN consisting of 20 nodes Fig. 8. Fig. 8a shows the numerical results for min(s), the worst case available bandwidth for I faults, as I is varied. Fig. 8b shows the numerical results for E [s] , the expected value of available bandwidth for 1 random faults. In Fig. 8c and 8d , we plot the probabilities of the available bandwidth exceeding 1 and 2 units respectively. The numerical values for E[s] and Pr(s 2 k ) were computed using the analytical expressions listed in Table 2 and verified using simulation. The numerical values obtained by simulation were within the 99% confidence interval of the values obtained by simulation.
From the graphs in Fig. 8 , we can make the following observations:
From Fig. 8a , it is seen that in the worst case, the available bandwidth of the optimal algorithm starts to fall only after the number of faults exceeds r. This is because, the optimal algorithm can redistribute up to Y faults such that they appear as single faults in the r newly constructed rings. Hence, up to Y faults can be tolerated without loss of available bandwidth when the optimal algorithm is used. On the other hand, with the baseline algorithm, the available bandwidth starts dropping after the second fault itself. It falls by one unit for addition of every two faults. This is because in the worst case, two faults are sufficient to make one FDDI trunk ring inoperative if there is no reconfiguration.
In most cases, our reconfiguration algorithm shows substantial improvement over the baseline algorithm. For example, as seen from Fig. 8b , when I = 10, the average available bandwidth with the baseline algorithm i s less than one unit while that with the optimal algorithm is about 3.0 units-an improvement of over 200%. Further, when I = 20, the average available bandwidth using the baseline algorithm is almost zero, indicating that the network virtually stops functioning. Under the same circumstances, the optimal algorithm achieves about 2.0 units of average available bandwidth.
Similar Observations can be made by studying Pr(s 2 k), the probability that at least k out of Y rings are operational. Fig. 8c demonstrates that with the optimal reconfiguration algorithm, the probability of having at least one operational ring is nearly 100% for up to 25 faults. On the other hand, with the baseline algorithm, this probability drops rapidly beyond 8 faults and is almost 0 for 25 or more faults. Fig. 8d shows that for 20 trunk link faults the probability that two out of the four rings are operational is nearly 100% for the optimal algorithm but it is zero for the baseline algorithm. 
FINAL REMARKS
Future high speed networks for mission-critical applications will be required to have a high degree of survivability, i.e., apacity to survive extensive damage. Not only ks maintain their connectivity, but they the quality of service required to run ns reliably. Bandwidth availability is crucial is objective. The key feature of this study has been to demonstrate the suitability of FBRN for missioncritical applications. The proposed FBRN is practical because, it can be implemented using current FDDI technology in both the hardware and the software domains. Minimal versions of the FBRN (using only two FDDI trunk rings) have already been implemented [21] . We developed a reconfiguration algorithm for FBRNs. This algorithm is optzmal in the sense that it constructs a connection plan that achieves the maximum possible available bandwidth for a given fault pattern. Due to the combinatorial nature of the problem, searching for such a connection plan is a challenging task. A trivial exhaustive ould result in exponential complexity. By abthe essential features of an FBRN configuration that determine its available bandwidth, our algorithm achieves a polynomial tim
We measured the surv of the network in terms of the available bandwid important metric in environments where exposure to violent destructive forces is a concern. We derived an expression for the available bandwidth when the optimal algorithm is used. We also carried out the worst case and probabilistic analysis of the available bandwidth. The performance evaluation of the optimal algorithm is of particular erest because it provides an upper bound on the performance of any other reconfiguration algorithm. Our analytical results clearly demonstrated the dramatic improvements in available bandwidth obtained with an FBRN using the optimal reconfiguration algorithm over an ordinary multiple-FDDI network. These improvements have been achieved by fully exploiting the reconfiguration capability of FBRN nodes as well as the built-in fault tolerance of FDDI networks.
The optimal algorithm developed in this paper uses the global system fault status as its mput. Thus, this algorithm r e qwes some communication among nodes prior to its execution. Currently, we are working on a fully dlstributed reconfiguration algorithm that avoids need for communication among nodes by using only locally avallable mformation, and yet maintains a near-ophmal performance under all conditions.
DIX-PROOF OF AL
In this appehdix, we provide p To prove that the connection plan generated by the algorithm is valid, we need to show quirements specified by (1) and ( that the overall fault status of th by Phase 2 is same as G, the one corresponding to the actual FBRN. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Before proving the optimality of the reconfiguration algorithm, it is necessary to establish some lemmas. The following lemma states that G' is a zero vector whenever Phase 2 constructs a logical ring with all nonfaulty links, and once such a ring is constructed, the remaining logical rings constructed will also be made up of nonfaulty links. 
0
The following lemma asserts a property of G' that must hold when the algorithm constructs a ring with more than one fault: G' must have at least two elements whose values equal the number of logical rings that remain to be constructed. It also states that all the rings constructed after this stage will have more than one fault. We proceed to prove the desired result by examining fl(vl) (i.e., the number of faulty links) of vl, the first logical ring constructed in Phase 2. There are
Each of these cases will be considered separately. 
bw(v,) = 1 and v1 E v, we know that bw(% 2 1.
Hence, opt, the bandwidth-measure associated with ), must be at least 1. CO X t Q(G) Since b w ( 3 2 1, t a1 ring x4 E X such that bw(xq) = 1,i e., fl(x,) i 1 .
In other words, there must be one logical ring xq E X such that either none of its links are faulty (fl(xq) = 0) ly one of its links is faulty (fl(xq) = 1). We con- An examination of the pseudocode shows that the time complexity of Phase 2 i : , dominated by the step that requires searching for the minimum index corresponding to the maximum value in G' (line 6). This can be done using a heap structure and has a complexity of O(n log n). Also, generating r logjcal rings involves n r steps.
Hence, the complexity of Phase 2 is O(n log n + nu). In Phase 3, each node has to search for a pair of suitable left and right ports wlhile constructing each of the r logical rings. Hence, tht. complexity of Phase 3 is O(r ).
It is reasonable to assurne that n > Y. Hence, the overall complexity of the algorithm is dominated by that of 2 Phase 2 which is; O(n log n + nu).
U

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The work reported in this piper was supported in part by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under Grant F49620-92-J-O385DEF, the National Science Foundation under Grant NCR-9210583, the Office of Navy Research under Grant N00014-92-J-4031, and an Engineering Excellence Grant from Texas A&M University. The authors would like to thank several monymous reviewers for their useful comments.
